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Abstract: 
The recent transnational, global and cultural turns have challenged international 
historians to reconsider the approach, purpose and value of their field. Although the 
new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation 
state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of 
international history have expanded too far and that the cultural turn’s preoccupation 
with national discourses at the expense of international structures and processes is 
diverting the field away from the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of 
peace.  I will argue that international history should distinguish itself from global and 
transnational history by drawing clear yet open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of 
inquiry needs some consensus about what it is, where it is going and why, in other 
words, an identity, purpose and values. I will argue that what defines international 
history is its focus on the origins, structures, processes and outcomes of international 
politics, above all the causes of war and the conditions of peace. 
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The debate about what international historians do, how they do it, why, and the value of 
the knowledge they create prompted by recent historiographical trends such as the 
cultural turn has benefited the field. For example the study of cultural diplomacy and 
cultural transfer between states has expanded to include the culture of diplomatic 
practice.1 The cultural turn has also prompted a broader debate about fundamental 
epistemic and methodological issues in diplomatic and international history.2 Similarly, 
the global and transnational turns have shown that the complex webs of non-national 
interactions that made the modern world were richer and much more transformative 
than any analysis of state-to-state diplomacy would have revealed. 3  Yet, as a 
practitioner, I am concerned that the boundaries of international history have expanded 
too far and that the cultural turn’s preoccupation with national discourses at the 
expense of international structures and processes is diverting the field away from the 
analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. A century after the outbreak of 
the First World War, the danger of major war may have receded but it has not 
vanished.4 The conflict in the Ukraine, endemic wars in the Middle East, maritime 
disputes in South East Asia and global arms rivalry remind us that the imperatives and 
ideals that inspired the study of international history a century ago remain pertinent 
today. 
 In my contribution to this special issue, I will argue that international history 
should distinguish itself from global and transnational history by drawing clear yet 
open disciplinary boundaries. Every field of inquiry needs some consensus about what 
it is, where it is going and why, in other words, an identity, purpose and values. I will 
argue that what defines international history is its focus on the origins, structures, 
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processes and outcomes of international politics, above all the causes of war and the 
conditions of peace. In resisting the various turns, I believe that there is a danger that 
this essay will be misread as a defence of policy-making narratives derived from the 
‘objective’ facts to be found only in official papers and as a refutation of theory. These 
are not my arguments. What I applaud in the recent historiographical trends is their 
rejection of the nation state as the primary frame of analysis. In my view, the history of 
international politics is too often written from a single national-diplomatic perspective 
and without an explicit conception of international politics. What the field needs is a 
revitalisation of the internationalist values and the systemic approach to international 
politics first elaborated by its founders a century ago. In the first part of this essay, I will 
set out the systemic approach to the history of international relations. In the second 
part, I will assess the benefits and drawbacks of the recent historiographical turns. 
 Although diplomatic history has nineteenth-century roots in the work of the 
great Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke, international history emerged in Britain in 
the aftermath of the Great War as a branch of what Donald Cameron Watt called 
‘disaster studies’.5 In other words, international history was born of the search for the 
causes of the war in the resolve that such a cataclysm should never reoccur. The 
founders of international history (and international relations) were turn-of-the-century 
British liberal intellectuals, public figures and philanthropists who proposed a new 
world organisation to preserve the peace once the war was over. These progressive 
thinkers saw the origins of the war not in the policies or actions of any one great power, 
but in what the philosopher Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson described in the title of his 
1917 book as The European Anarchy. For Dickinson and others, in what became the 
League of Nations movement, the unbridled pursuit by the great powers of their selfish 
policies generated the forces of nationalism, imperialism and militarism, which 
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conspired in the summer of 1914 to cause a great war.6 The establishment of the League 
of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 offered these thinkers and political 
activists some hope that the international anarchy could be quelled through collective 
security and the rule of law, but the bellicose public outcry that year for a punitive 
peace to be imposed on Germany pointed in a more ominous direction. To promote 
public reconciliation in Europe and to underpin the League of Nations with scholarly 
research, internationalist-minded benefactors invested in the ‘scientific’ study of 
international affairs, including the endowment of new professorships. In 1919, for 
example, the Welsh industrialist David Davies endowed the Woodrow Wilson chair in 
international politics at the University College of Aberystwyth. Six years later the 
Scottish philanthropist Daniel Stevenson endowed a professorship at the newly 
established British [later Royal] Institution of International Affairs, Chatham House.7 In 
1932, the Stevenson chair in international history moved to the London School of 
Economics, where it became Britain’s top appointment in the field.  
 It is worth reflecting on what Stevenson wanted the chair holders to do because 
his goals exemplify the motives and values that inspired what was the international turn 
in history. During the late nineteenth century the writing of triumphalist national 
histories was central to the ‘invention’ of nation-states and national identities.8 
Stevenson and others in his intellectual set believed that this type of chauvinistic 
nationalism transmitted through the writing and teaching of history in Europe had 
stoked antagonisms conducive to war. National history, he argued, had created ‘among 
the peoples from childhood onwards a spirit of antipathy, ill-will and even hatred of 
other peoples … [he was] convinced that the teaching of history internationally and as 
far as practicable without bias would tend to substitute for this spirit a spirit of 
international co-operation, peace and good will …’.9 In the tradition of von Ranke, 
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Stevenson wanted historians to critically engage multiple archives, but without the 
Prussian’s glorification of the nation-state as the vanguard of modernity. This 
international turn in history, the Scottish philanthropist hoped, would enlighten future 
generations about ‘how other nations interpreted history in its relation to Great Britain 
as opposed to the usual method by which history [was] taught only from the point of 
view of one country’.10 
  One might dismiss Stevenson’s desire for peace through a cosmopolitan 
curriculum as detached from the realities of power politics and typical of what E. H. Carr 
criticised in 1939 in The Twenty Years’ Crisis as ‘utopian’ thinking about international 
affairs. Yet scholars now challenge the myth of a ‘first great debate’ in international 
relation theory between starry-eyed ‘idealists’ and hard-nosed ‘realists’. Carr’s 
categorisation, they contend, was a rhetorical device he used to lump together a rich 
and sophisticated variety of liberal thought about war prevention that he disagreed 
with.11 We need not resolve this debate about a realist-idealist divide to recognise that 
Stevenson for idealistic reasons promoted a methodology of enduring practical value. 
Multi-archival research does offer scholars a dispassionate and systematic analytical 
perspective on the unfolding of international events. At the time Stevenson and others 
championed the international turn in the study of foreign affairs, governments tried to 
manipulate the historical debate about the war’s origins for patriotic purposes. The 
defeated and victorious powers alike published selected volumes of diplomatic 
documents from their archives to absolve themselves of responsibility for the outbreak 
of the war. This sudden and unprecedented publication of secret official papers by most 
of the great powers had the unintended consequence of helping to establish 
international history as a field in its own right. During the interwar years, the published 
official papers also helped to form a consensus among scholars that war had come not 
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as the result of a premeditated plan hatched in Berlin, but inadvertently in the midst of 
a great power crisis that had spun out control.12  
 The subsequent debate about Germany’s ‘war guilt’ illustrates the way in which 
the historiography divided into national and international approaches to archival 
research and to the conceptualisation of international politics. Some scholars 
concentrated on German policy-making and German sources. The most important work 
of this type was Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht and his Krieg der Illusionen. 
Challenging the consensus of the interwar years, Fischer argued that German leaders 
had launched a pre-planned war in 1914. His books, especially the second, not only laid 
bare what he saw as damning evidence from German archives that revealed, among 
other things, that the Kaiser and his advisors had decided on war in 1912, but Fischer 
also argued that Imperial Germany’s aggression abroad sprang from the ruling elite’s 
efforts to avert social and economic change at home. At a time when historians turned 
away from traditional political history to the novel methodologies of social and 
economic history, the thesis that domestic policy determined foreign policy (der Primat 
der Innenpolitik) inspired a generation of scholars to delve deep into the internal 
structural sources of German imperialism.13 In contrast, the international approach 
analysed the interaction of decisions and actions by all the powers reconstructed from 
documents drawn from multiple state archives. The classic work of this type is Luigi 
Albertini’s three-volume study of the July 1914 crisis, which was published in Italy in 
1942-43 and translated into English in the 1950s. The most recent example of the 
international approach is Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to 
War in 1914. Albertini and Clark place the largest share of responsibility for the war on 
Germany’s leaders, but they also show that Berlin was not solely responsible for the 
war. The foreign policies of Britain, France and Russia, especially their disregard for 
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Austria-Hungary’s mounting security crisis in the Balkans, affected the decisions made 
in Berlin and Vienna. From the international and comparative standpoint, the war was 
initiated by a complex and cumulative interplay of decisions and actions that raised the 
willingness of all the powers to run risks and to play for ever-higher stakes that fateful 
summer.14 
 My goal in contrasting the two approaches is not to suggest that we should 
dispense with national history, but instead to underscore the centrality of multi-
archival research and a conception of what the states system is in international history. 
Fischer and his followers enhanced our understanding of how foreign policies are made 
by showing us that we need to take into account a wide range of domestic actors and 
influences on policy-making, but any analysis that seeks the causes of wars in the 
internal malfunctions of a single state is self-limiting. A single-state analysis cannot 
capture the interactive dynamics of arms rivalry, alliance politics and imperialism that 
for instance had so profoundly marred the global scene before 1914, nor how 
international relations shape the internal politics of states. What prompted Stevenson 
and other liberal internationalists to promote the League of Nations was their 
conviction that arms races, rival alliances and rabid nationalism were not simply the 
consequences of wicked and war-like states or statesmen, but instead features of a 
chaotic and unprincipled states system.15 Stevenson advocated multi-national and 
multi-archival research as the most empirically sound method to fully comprehend 
these war-promoting dysfunctions and as a step to addressing them through the 
collective management of world politics. A research technique alone, however, does not 
define a field of inquiry. Reliable historical knowledge is produced when understanding 
acquired from the critical analysis of primary sources converges with theoretical 
explanations of how the world works. Stevenson advocated the empirical method, but 
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others of his intellectual milieu such as the jurist James Bryce, the economist J. A. 
Hobson and philosopher Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson helped to lay down the 
conceptual foundations of the field’s object of inquiry, the international system. 
 These early thinkers identified anarchy, the absence of an all-powerful rule-
enforcing authority to impose order, as the defining condition of international politics.16 
According to the orthodox accounts of the rise of modern international politics in 
history and international relations, the insecurity of anarchy drove the armed rivalry 
among the sovereign political communities that arose in Europe through the 
competitive process of state-formation from the late fifteenth century as the Holy 
Roman Empire and Christendom splintered.17 Why the European idea of the nation-
state triumphed globally as the ordering principle in international law for people, 
territory and politics from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century is a complex, 
contingent and contested story.18  What is not contested is that state sovereignty has 
never been absolute, and that states have functioned as parts of a larger, and over the 
last three centuries an increasingly integrated, international system.19 As theorists point 
out, an international system exhibits two defining features. First, because it is an 
interconnected whole, change in one part of a system affects other parts. Second, the 
rapid interaction of conflicting policies and actions of major international actors in the 
system produces effects that are independent of the expectations and intentions of any 
actor. Political scientists have done the most work in elaborating this systemic approach 
to the study of international relations.20 To my mind, the systemic approach is central to 
the question of what international history is because explaining the persistence of war 
and periods of relative peace requires the analysis of the structures, processes and 
effects of international systems as interconnected wholes. 
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 For international historians the principal methodological implication of the 
systemic approach is that a conception of how states systems form, function and change 
over time is needed to make sense of multiple national archives. Pure empiricism would 
be naive. Even if one possessed all the languages and boundless time and energy needed 
to assemble all the available records pertinent to a particular historical episode or 
period in international affairs, the resulting hotchpotch would only convey so much. 
One would learn a great plurality of subjective views on the unfolding of interstate 
relations, but participants could not have grasped the whole of what was occurring and 
how others saw it, or could have known all the forces and dynamics at play, and much of 
what was widely understood (the ‘rules of the game’) was not written down. A theory is 
required to select, interpret and make sense of the archives and the documents they 
contain and to frame explanations for why things occurred the way they did and with 
what results.21 The idea that the condition of anarchy locked states into an unending 
struggle for power and security (vividly described as the ‘perpetual quadrille’ in A.J.P. 
Taylor’s The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914) provided historians with an 
elementary framework.22 Anarchy, hegemony, the security dilemma and the balance of 
power likewise became core concepts in international relations theory, especially for 
classical and neo-realist thinkers. Liberal theorists later argued that anarchy did not 
preclude the formation of stable world orders (what Hedley Bull called the ‘anarchical 
society’) through institution building and economic integration. More recently, 
constructivists, who draw on the theoretical insights of sociology and anthropology, 
have described the international system as an inter-subjective construct mutually 
constituted by states (a theoretical point pithily expressed by Alexander Wendt’s phrase 
‘anarchy is what states make of it’).23 What these theoretical traditions offer historians 
of international relations are useful conceptualisations of how international systems 
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form, function and change over time. I am not suggesting that historians should follow 
them slavishly, but instead we should employ them heuristically in a creative tension 
between the empirical interpretations, explanations and source analysis of history and 
the explanatory and constitutive theorising of political science.24 
 In fact, by tradition historians are methodologically inclined to combine the 
material-structural focus of realism and the ideational emphasis of liberalism and 
constructivism to account for change in international politics. The exemplar of this type 
of conceptually sophisticated international history is Paul Schroeder’s magisterial study 
of the Vienna peace, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848.25 Schroeder’s 
thesis is that 1813-15 was a decisive turning point from the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth century systems, a transformation from a predatory war-prone balance of 
power among the great powers to a cooperative political equilibrium.26 What is most 
pertinent to my argument about the necessary relationship between theory and sources 
in international history is Schroeder’s conceptualisation of the international system as 
not simply an array of interacting political units and the relative distribution of power 
among them, but also ‘the constituent rules of a practice or a civic association: the 
understandings, assumptions, learned skills and responses, rules, norms, procedures, 
etc. which agents acquire and use in pursuing their individual divergent aims within the 
framework of a shared practice.’27 For Schroeder a ‘systemic analysis’ determines how 
the game of international politics was played and the outcomes it produced, and how 
the rules shaped, enabled and limited the actions of the players. 
What places Schroeder’s work firmly in the tradition of international history as it 
was initially elaborated a century ago is his assertion of ‘the superiority of systemic-
level explanations and structural analysis over [state-level] explanations of 
international politics’.28 Appreciating that the dynamics of international politics work 
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autonomously from what goes on within even the most powerful states does not imply 
that we need to adopt a crude form of the primacy of foreign policy (der Primat der 
Aussenpolitik).29 Few if any international historians today would assert that the analysis 
of internal and external politics can be entirely separated. For example, Matthew 
Connelly’s fine study of how the liberationists won Algeria’s post-1945 fight for 
independence from France at the international level in a struggle that entangled the 
domestic and external spheres of not only the main protagonists, but also those of 
adjacent countries and the United States and also involved non-state actors, illustrates 
that historians ignore either sphere at their peril.30 In their study of US Cold War policy, 
Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall employ the term ‘intermestic’ for instances when 
the international and the domestic in national policy-making are so intertwined that 
trying to disentangle them makes no analytical sense.31 Yet arguing that domestic and 
international politics interacted in important ways, or pointing to moments when 
national politics or the personal or cultural predispositions of a particular policy maker 
overrides external factors in policy making, does not mean that the domestic and 
international carry equal causal weight in explaining world politics, or even for political 
changes that are usually explained in national terms. As Michael Reynolds shows in his 
multi-archival study of the Russian and Ottoman empires from 1908 to 1918, the 
nationalisms that scholars usually credit for the collapse of the two empires did not 
simply arise from domestic pressures, but were instead generated by the conflict 
between them and shaped by aggressive geopolitical norms.32 Similarly, Eric Weitz 
argues that the Paris peace settlement of 1919-1923 legitimised a normative shift in the 
international system from the politics of territorial adjustments between multi-national, 
multi-confessional empires ruled by dynastic elites to the twentieth-century ideal of 
‘national homogeneity under the state’.33 This precise alignment of territorial and 
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ethnographic norms as to what constituted the ideal political unit in the states system 
would have deadly ramifications from then on. What the examples of the relative peace 
of the Concert of Europe, the victory of the Algerian liberationists over superior French 
armed forces, the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian empires, and the shift in the ideal 
political order at the turn of the last century all share is that none of them can be 
explained by chronicling the intentions of officials and the policy choices made in 
foreign ministries or cabinet offices. This conceptual point is especially true of the most 
distinct of modern phenomena that blighted the international systems of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, arms races. While scholars debate how much arms 
races constrained or even determined state behaviour and how transformative they 
were in prompting the growth of ‘military industrial complexes’, there is no doubt that 
in the last century the dynamics of arms rivalry at times spiralled beyond the capacity of 
any national leader to control and that national leaders feared that they would mandate 
war.34 
Of course knowing how foreign policy was made and the mindsets and intentions 
of national leaders is important to explaining why a particular policy was pursued, 35 
but what happens inside a state can only reveal so much about the constraints that the 
system placed on national goals and action and the possibilities it opened for statesmen, 
in other words the potential for the exercise of power. Power is the most universal and 
slippery of terms in the study of international relations. Scholars often confront the 
seeming paradox of unrealised power (usually attributed to a lack of will) and the way 
the ‘weak’ frustrate the ‘strong’ in diplomacy, war and in the struggle for authority and 
legitimacy. As theorists suggest, power is not a quality or possession of one actor, but a 
relationship among actors.36 This insight again underlines the need to grasp world 
politics from multiple archives and perspectives if we are to understand the extent and 
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limits of national power. As Christopher Thorne, Akira Iriye and Robert J. McMahon 
have warned, uni-archival diplomatic history can breed a kind of national self-
absorption, in which the tangled interplay of different centres of potential power and 
influence by a plurality of actors of international relations is reduced to a series of 
bilateral relationships that radiate out from one capital.37 This proclivity is particularly 
evident in US diplomatic history, which is infused with a sense that Washington has 
been at the centre of world events since the 1940s as well as an implicit faith in 
American exceptionalism.38 In a recent survey of the field, for example, Thomas W. 
Zeiler described US diplomatic history as ‘a clearing house of sorts for work on America 
and the world’. While praising international historians for revealing how foreign 
influences affected ‘US projects abroad,’ he cautions against too much 
internationalisation because of the ‘risks of losing sight of the Americanness that is the 
very character of US diplomatic history.’39 One searches Zeiler’s otherwise fascinating 
essay in vain for any reflection on whether the America-centric character of US 
diplomatic history may distort how Americans understand world politics by 
encouraging what Stanley Hoffmann described as a proclivity for ‘solipsistic 
exuberance’.40 Ultimately, the fixation of diplomatic history of any national brand with 
national policy-making obscures the interactive nature of international relations. It 
portrays what happens on the international stage as a mere result of the dysfunctional 
political regime of one power, 41 the personal or cultural inclinations of policy elites, or 
of the wisdom or folly of a few politicians. In British diplomatic history, this distortion 
pervades the long-exhausted debate about the British prime minister Neville 
Chamberlain’s efforts to ‘appease’ Adolf Hitler.42 Ironically, the one conceit that 
historians who criticise the policies of Chamberlain share with him is an exaggerated 
sense that Europe’s fate in the 1930s rested on what would be decided in London.43 The 
  15 of 35 
source of the distortion is part methodological, part ideological. As its critics maintain, 
the study of high politics has a built-in bias for elevating human agency to the status of 
historical prime mover because it explains change as a consequence of the thoughts, 
deeds and virtues of elites. During the Cold War, this inherent bias was reinforced by 
the ideological conflict against the Soviet Union: western diplomatic historians played 
their own part in the struggle in championing the cause of individual liberty over the 
collectivism and historical determinism of Marxist-Leninism in the historiography by 
asserting the primacy of human agency and contingency over structures and 
impersonal forces.44  
 While historians of national policy making tend to inflate the power and 
importance of the state, the reverse is true of global-transnational historians. By 
highlighting the growth of transnational movements, coalitions and actors, these 
scholars write the state out of history. As a corrective to the dominance of state-centric 
historiography, the transnational and global turns have been an enormous benefit by 
showing how increasing flows of people, goods and ideas drove the integrating 
processes we now call globalisation. Transnational and global historians elucidate 
border defying phenomena such as migration, political activism, social, cultural and 
religious movements, the creation of intellectual, scientific and professional networks, 
the spread of organised crime and terrorist groups, cultural encounters, clashes and 
diffusion, the expansion of world trade, global finance and multi-national corporations, 
and the rise of international institutions and non-governmental organisations.45 
Transnational historians have explored in depth and detail what the ‘English School’ of 
international relations theorists called ‘international society’,46 and they have traced 
how human rights norms and grass roots activism swayed state policy.47 The analytical 
problem with the transnational turn, however, is how to relate the transnational sphere 
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to the states system. On this score, a recent analysis by Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and 
Karen Gram-Skjoldager of the narrative structures of transnational histories is revealing 
about the underlying attitudes and analytical assumptions of transnational and global 
historians: when the state appears in transnational narratives at all, the authors 
contend, it is usually in the shape of an ‘opponent’ to be overcome by ‘heroic’ 
transnational actors or as an obstacle to be pushed aside by the unstoppable forces of 
global integration.48  
 One can of course simply argue that expanding transnational linkages enmeshed 
modern states in a stabilising web of interdependence. Yet, it is equally plausible (and I 
would add much more credible) to argue that the transnational sphere expanded over 
the last two centuries more as a result than as a cause of a more managed and stable 
order among states. It was no coincidence that the field of transnational history took off 
in the 1990s. At that time many believed that the end of total wars and the Cold War 
would allow the globalisation of the late nineteenth century to resume apace. Ever 
accelerating flows of people, capital and ideas would erase borders. In the coming post-
territorial order, geo-politics would yield to geo-economics, global governance would 
pass to non-governmental organisations and global civil society would act as the 
world’s conscience and curb the actions of states.49 In the last decade the post-Cold War 
optimism that inspired this sort of thinking has abated. States and nationalism are 
resurgent. The way in which governments have coped with the challenge of the Internet 
tells a larger story about the resilience of state power in this time of globalisation. The 
Internet was at first heralded as the ‘information superhighway’ that would annihilate 
borders and liberate people from the leviathan, but now major governments have 
asserted state sovereignty over what is a globe-spanning patchwork of linked national 
networks governed by national laws and policed by national law enforcement agencies. 
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The Internet, moreover, has evolved into a competitive arena for traditional interstate 
activities such as espionage, covert operations and political warfare.50 The proliferation 
of cross-border connections and non-state actors have been neglected in the 
historiography of the modern world, but that does not mean that the states system and 
the horrific violence it can produce are less significant or demanding of historical 
inquiry than we had previously thought. Indeed, the dark side of globalisation – one that 
global and transnational historians neglect - has been the escalating lethality, speed and 
global reach of the nation-state’s means of destruction, a development that has not 
ceased since the explosion of the first atomic bombs over Japan in 1945. Since the 1990s 
some historians appear to have forgotten that the great expansion of the transnational 
sphere from the 1970s occurred in the shadow of a strategic nuclear deadlock between 
the superpowers and their allies. As Holger Nehring has argued in a wide-ranging 
review of The Cambridge History of the Cold War, in their rush to embrace novel 
approaches and to demonstrate the conflict’s relevance to every aspect of the post-1945 
world, historians have ‘tamed’ the most dangerous confrontation in human history by 
‘decentring’ the Cold War away from its military and diplomatic core. Cold War 
historians, Nehring concludes, ‘have lost sight of one of the key elements of the “Cold 
War”: its war-like character.’51 
  The issue of what the central focus of international history should be takes me to 
the cultural turn. Most of the debate about the application of cultural approaches to 
national policy has raged among historians of American foreign relations. As it is framed 
in the pages of Diplomatic History, this debate pits traditionalists against culturalists, 
with the former upholding at least the ideal of objectivity, the effort to grasp the 
intentions of leading actors from the rational arguments contained in the archival 
sources and the policy-relevance of diplomatic history, while the latter assert that 
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knowledge is discursively constructed, that policy-makers interpret the world through 
historically contingent frameworks of meaning that shape behaviour in significant yet 
often unconscious ways, and that the goal of policy-relevance encourages the 
reproduction of the underlying political assumptions that legitimate power.52 This 
divide reflects an ideological/political one, with the traditionalists leery about the ‘de-
centring’ (or, as they see it, diminishing) of the role of the US in shaping the last century 
and the culturalists critical of ‘Cold War triumphalism’.53 Add to that the dominance of 
the cultural approach in the historical profession generally in the United States and in 
some parts of Europe, which places young scholars in the field under pressure to 
connect their research to wider historiographical trends and to impress hiring and 
promotion committees.  
  These political and professional issues aside, the central question is whether the 
cultural turn offers a transformative critique of the field’s concepts and methods. In my 
view, the answer is mixed. Certainly one benefit of the cultural turn has been a renewed 
and more systematic study of the power of ideas in foreign affairs, especially of values, 
beliefs and identity.54 As well as familiar analytical categories such as ideology and 
geopolitics, cultural historians explore how memory, metaphors, religion, and the 
rhetoric of class, race, ethnicity and gender have guided decision makers and 
legitimised the policies of empire, war and bellicose posturing on the world’s stage. 
Culturalists have questioned the realist-behaviourist premise that officials rationally 
calculate responses to the world in relation to a fixed national interest.55 Many scholars 
consider discursively constructed national identities key factors in how states 
interact.56 The new studies of emotions, sexuality and statecraft, moreover, are a 
reminder that officials were not policy-spouting robots, but human beings with 
passions, appetites, fears and biases.57 Still, as critics often point out, these insights are 
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not especially novel, though some of the analytic categories cultural historians employ 
are new. Diplomatic historians such as Zara Steiner have long sought to grasp the 
complex motives of policy makers, to reconstruct the rich and varied mental universes 
they inhabited and to understand how social status concepts such as honour, rank, 
reputation and prestige motivated foreign policy elites.58 Critics of the cultural turn in 
diplomatic history also argue that culturalists do not connect the discursive formations 
that they illuminate to the dynamic ways in which policy was made. According to critics, 
culture in this way thus becomes a static, vague and all-pervasive influence on the 
foreign policy decision making with the result that the causality of cultural beliefs are 
exaggerated at the expense of wider social structures and material conditions.59 
 While I agree with these criticisms, my prime reservation about the cultural turn 
is the preoccupation of culturalists with national policy and policy makers. In their 
effort to show that officials were driven by complex motives and biases, which have not 
often figured in diplomatic narratives and which are not spelled out in the archives, and 
to illustrate the subjective and the self-interested element in the perception of external 
threats and the articulation of national interests, culturalists end up – to use Volker 
Dekpat’s phrase - ‘universalising the domestic’.60 The idea is not new. The argument 
that ruling elites configure perceptions of the external world to uphold the status quo 
internally dates to nineteenth century radical critiques of the German empire.61 
Fischer’s thesis inspired a generation of historians in the 1960s and 1970s who saw 
geopolitical explanations for German decision-making in 1914 as nothing more than an 
attempt to shift Germany’s war guilt abroad.62 The cultural turn in US foreign policy 
history stems from a similar mistrust of external, interactive explanations for the way in 
which American foreign policy elites have described and reacted to the world. While 
interrogating the motives and unspoken assumptions of policy elites and identifying 
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internal pressures on foreign policy is laudable, the advent of this cultural variant of der 
Primat der Innenpolitik is nevertheless conceptually retrograde. That the international 
constituted a political realm distinct yet not detached from the domestic was the chief 
insight of the founders of the field. Interstate rivalry compelled foreign policy elites to 
look outward from the state and to be especially sensitive to the geographic, economic 
and dynamic power relations that shaped the external world. The states system, they 
lamented, even had the power to impose its own rules and norms of behaviour. As 
Lowes Dickinson argued in 1917, whatever their personal, moral and (we can certainly 
add) cultural inclinations, the international anarchy turned all statesmen into 
Machiavellians.63 Cultural historians may have raised our appreciation for the cultural 
sources of foreign policy and shown that the discursive construction of national 
interests contain important unspoken cultural assumptions, but decision makers 
through the medium of language are still ensnared by autonomous social structures 
formed at the international level. The dynamics of international systems and the way in 
which states have responded to them may not be reducible to a few law-like theoretical 
propositions, but that does not mean that systems never existed at all.  
 Critics of the cultural turn also contend that culturalists simply set out the 
discursive context of national policy without explaining action and change in the world, 
while the culturalists reply that action can only be fully explained in the context of 
socially constructed belief systems that make social action meaningful. 64  The 
culturalists are I think correct to assert that agency and structure are inseparable and 
that diplomatic historians are prone to inflate the efficacy of human action.65 However, 
their preoccupation with national culture and statecraft, the fact that they draw 
theoretical inspiration from literary and cultural studies rather than from international 
relations theory, and their lack of interest in the ideational and material structures that 
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shape the world in which states exist, renders them ill-equipped to explain causes and 
outcomes in international politics.66 Advocates of the cultural approach are probably 
content with this situation because their identity as epistemic rebels rests on decentring 
US diplomatic history from war and geopolitics in order to critique the cultural and 
ideological predispositions of American foreign policy elites. This is regrettable because 
great insights about causation in world politics can come from an understanding of the 
dialectical interactions of agents and structures and the constitutive practices (war, 
trade and diplomacy) of states in the international systems.67 Though not self-styled 
culturalists, the way in which Paul Schroeder, Michael Reynolds and Eric Weitz analyse 
the systemic effects of normative change in the history of international politics, which I 
set out earlier in this essay, illustrates that historians can account for the agential power 
of ideas without dispensing with individual and collective human agency, social 
structures and material conditions.68  
 Debate about purpose and values is the lifeblood of any field of inquiry, but the 
idiom of historiographic turns has an unfortunate ‘foreclosure effect’ on the insights, 
aims and values of earlier generations. 69  In international history, the global, 
transnational and cultural turns have blurred the field’s boundaries and shifted 
attention away from the causes of war and the conditions of peace. Methodological 
innovation and pluralism are welcome, but the danger of a larger scope is a loss of 
coherence and purpose. While transnational historians neglect the relationship between 
the states system and the transnational sphere, practitioners of the cultural turn in US 
diplomatic history nationalise the international. War, diplomacy and the interaction of 
policy elites are not the only activities of significance in the history of our globalising 
world, but the horrific potential of the states system for violence must be the prime 
concern for any academic endeavour that adopts the epithet ‘international’. A century 
  22 of 35 
ago, the founders of international history sought to understand what had caused the 
First World War to help prevent future catastrophes.70 The concepts and methods that 
they began to elaborate were not based on a wholesale acceptance of the assumptions 
and biases in the state papers. Instead, they rejected the inherent nationalism and 
national perspective of the diplomatic records and appreciated that national leaders 
were subject to external structures and forces beyond their control. In these 
particularly nationalistic and violent times, what the field needs is to renew the sense of 
mission and purpose that inspired its foundation. 
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